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The Axiom of Monotonicity (AM) is a necessary condition for a
number of expected utility representations, including those obtained
by de Finetti (1930), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Savage
(1954), and Anscombe and Auman (1963). The paper reports on ex-
periments that directly test AM by eliminating strategic uncertainty,
context, and peer e¤ects. In one treatment, the state space is simple
to formulate. Here we do not observe violations of AM. When the
state space is a bit more obscure, we nd signicant violations of AM.
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1 Introduction
An intuitively appealing postulate in decision theory is the axiom of monotonic-
ity (AM). It stipulates that if for each state of nature, the consequence of
some act f is preferred to that of another act g, then f is preferred to g. The
axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Savage (1954) imply
AM. The axiom is explicitly taken into consideration in the representations
provided by de Finetti (1930), Anscombe and Aumann (1963), Schmeidler
(1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) and others (see Gilboa, 2009). AM
also has broader implications that go beyond decision theory. In strategic
settings, for example, AM provides an epistemic foundation for the choice of
dominant strategies. In one way or another, the axiom of monotonicity is
central to the way we understand individual decision making today.
In recent years experimental methods have been instrumental in putting
important axioms to rigorous testing. This is probably best exemplied by
Ellsberg (1961) who constructed an intuitive scenario for choice under ambi-
guity in which people violate Savages Sure Thing Principle (postulate P2 in
Savage) over acts.1 Ellsbergs experiment motivated much of the theoretical2
and experimental3 work on ambiguity aversion. In the same spirit, a recent
experiment by Charness, Karni and Levin (2010) explores the robustness of
what Khaneman and Tversky (1983) called a conjunction fallacyan ob-
served violation of rst-order stochastic dominance which implies a violation
of Svages postulate P3. This particular violation was found to be not ro-
bust to certain perturbations. Violations diminished in salient decisions and
practically vanished when subjects decided in teams.
1To be precise, subjects violated P2 or completeness or transitivity.
2This typically involves relaxing Savages axioms to derive, amongst others, the Cho-
quet Expected Utility representation in Schmeidler (1989), the Maxmin Expected Utility
representation in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and the representation of Klibano¤, Mari-
nacci and Mukerji (2005). It is appropriate to add here that AM is a necessary condition
for all of these approaches.
3A horse-race testing of various theoretical explanations for ambiguity aversion has
been done by Halevy (2007) and Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2010).
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Our focus is on the axiom of monotonicity. This axiom is so intuitive
that there would be no reason for doubting it, had it not been for a series
of intriguing studies that jointly establish the empirical relevance of what is
known as the disjunction fallacy(Shar and Tversky 1992a,b; and Croson
1999). These experiments suggest that substantial number of individuals (in
the order of 30-35%) make choices that are inconsistent with AM. If true,
this would have at least three important implications: (i) much of the current
decision theory would have limited applicability; (ii) because the violation
of AM is so non-intuitive it would pose a serious challenge for theoretical
modeling; (iii) our understanding of subjectschoices of dominated strategies
in games (e.g., prisoners dilemma) would have to be re-evaluated.
The purpose of our experiment is to understand, in as clean a manner as
possible, what causes violations of AM to emerge. Toward this end, we sub-
ject violations of AM to the toughest experimental test yet. To our knowledge
this is the rst test of AM in a salient, non-strategic and context-free setting.
We have two treatments. First, we imposed su¢ cient experimental controls
to create an environment as simple and transparent as possible. We hoped
to create an environment where reasons for AM violations did not exist.
Second, we perturbed the setting by reducing transparency. The objective
was to determine if there is an increase in violations of AM. Each of our two
treatment used a bingo cage as a randomizing device. A ball drawn randomly
from the cage, resolved the lottery chosen by a subject. In the transparent
treatment subjects got to see and count the total number of balls in the bingo
cage. Here, only 0-5% of the subjects made choices inconsistent with AM.
In the other treatment subjects did not know the total number of balls in
the bingo cage. In this simple scenario, a little amount of deliberation would
have convinced an astute subject that this lack of knowledge does not really
matter. Yet, about 18-25% of the subjects made choices inconsistent with
AM. Taking state-dependent decision theoretic framework as a good descrip-
tion of human behavior, we conclude that behavior is consistent with AM
when subjects are able to formulate the relevant state space. However, the
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inability to correctly formulate the relevant state space could lead to choices
inconsistent with AM.
Even when a decision maker nds it hard to describe the relevant state
space, she may still be able to rationally rank acts (or lotteries). This could
be done by deliberating directly on the likelihood of consequences without
considering the state space. The Bolker-Je¤rey approach to decision making
under uncertainty provides a relevant framework (Bolker 1966, 1967; and
Je¤rey 1965). A similar, but conceptually di¤erent framework is provided in
Ahn (2008). In Ahns paper, the set of consequences is innite. In Gravel,
Marchant and Sen (2009), the decision maker decides over nite sets of con-
sequences by providing equal weight to the elements in each set. Thus, as of
now, there is no theory wherein a rationaldecision maker could potentially
violate AM when consequences are nite. So from a theoretical perspective
we do not know what leads to the emergence of AM violations in simple
environments. However, Gilboa (1995, 2009) provides a criterion for deliber-
ations that does not directly take into account the state space and where AM
could be violated. For a given act (lottery) that is available to the decision
maker, she simply evaluates the relevant frequency of each consequence from
historical data.
We nd Gilboas intuition appropriate for interpreting our result. Con-
sider a decision maker (DM) who has to decide between advertising her prod-
ucts and not advertising.4 If she were to advertise, then depending on market
conditions she could either get high prots worth $75 or low prots worth
$25. If she were not to advertise, she could get either $85 or $35. DM nds it
di¢ cult to gure out the relevant market conditions and how they translate
into prots. So she carries out a small market survey which informs her that
three-fths of those who advertised got high prots while only one-fth of
those who did not advertise got high prots. Being an expected prot maxi-
mizer she chooses to advertise. As time passes, she is happy to note that she
is making high prots around three fths of the time. Now, along with the
4This example is a modied version of that in Kreps (1988).
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growth of her business, her circle of friends in the business community also
grows. She notices that those who sell similar products, but do not advertise,
also make high prots around three fths of the time. Her deliberations lead
her to gure out that high and low prots, in her business, have more to do
with the state of the economy than advertisement. Accordingly, she changes
her strategy to not advertise, and still makes high prots three fths of the
time. An economist, knowledgeable about the relevant state space would
conclude: in her early days DM violated AM, but as she got to learn about
the circumstances a¤ecting the consequences, she stopped violating AM.
In our experiment the mechanics of the bingo cage is much simpler than
that of the market.Yet, it seems that a signicant minority of subjects
are still unable to gure out the relevant state space and go on to violate
AM. When all the possible outcomes of the bingo cage are laid bare to the
subject, violations almost vanish. Of course, with a very large number of
repetitions, a subject could possibly be able to gure out the relevant state
space by herself. Instead of letting her collect this large sample herself, in
our simpler treatment she is just told about the number of balls. Thus, our
simpler treatment could be viewed as the culmination of a process where the
subject has got to learn enough about the relevant state space.
2 The Axiom of Monotonicity
In the world of Savage a decision maker is aware of a set of states of nature
S and a set of consequences C. An act is a function from S to C and A is
the set of all such functions. The decision maker has complete and transitive
preference,  (), over all acts in A. The decision maker also has a preference
relation over the elements of C. Let us call this relation R. Anscome and
Aumann (1963), and others, derive R (P ) from  (). Let us denote the so
derived preference as R(). Let an act which gives the same consequence x
in all states of nature be denoted fx.
Denition: For any two consequences x and y in C, if fx  ()f y then
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xR()(P ())y.
It is easy to see that R() is complete and transitive.
The axiom of monotonicity (AM): We say that preference  satises
the axiom of monotonicity in B, where B  A, if for any pair of acts f and
g in B, such that f(s)R()g(s) for all s in 
, we have f  g.
As mentioned earlier, AM is a fundamental axiom for most of decision
theory and has natural implications in game theoretic settings as well. In
a game, player is pure strategy can be thought of as an act which maps
from opponentspure strategy proles (the state space) to her own payo¤s.
If for all such proles (states), the payo¤ from strategy si is strictly greater
than that from any other strategy then si is said to be a dominant strategy.
When i knows the game, and knows that strategy choice is independent across
players, she knows that she can never be better o¤ by choosing a strategy
di¤erent from si.
Our main objective was to design a simple and direct test of AM. In our
experiment, subjects rst made a sequence of two choices, each between two
di¤erent monetary amounts. These choices were very simple. Each boiled
down to essentially choosing between a higher and a lower amount of money.
In the process, we assume that, R() is revealed. Then, we presented each
subject with a choice between two lotteries. The rst, dominant lottery, used
prizes that were revealed preferred, i.e., equal to the amounts chosen earlier,
and the dominated lottery used prizes that were revealed inferior. With this
structure a violation of AM would appear as the choice of the dominated
lottery.
The nature of uncertainty was at the heart of our experiment. To obtain
the most direct test of AM we rst implemented choice under full trans-
parency. We were very explicit about all the details of the randomization
process, used a physical randomization device - a bingo cage, and set the
probability for resolving the chosen lottery at 50%. In the second treatment,
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subjects were given no information about the number of balls in the bingo
cage.
In Shar and Tversky (1992b), subjects played a sequence of various pris-
oners dilemma games with randomly chosen opponents. At times, they saw
their opponents move before choosing their own actions and at times they
did not. Again, more than 30% of subjects who defected after observing the
opponents choice, cooperated when the opponents choice was unobservable.
Croson (1999) used across-subject design to support the disjunction e¤ect
hypothesis. In her experiment, subjects often cooperated in the simple pris-
oners dilemma. But when asked to state their belief about the opponents
play before choosing their own strategy, they defected at much higher rate.
Because our experiment uses within-subject design it can also be viewed
as a screening procedure for subjectsbehavioral types. We identify each sub-
ject as being behaviorally consistent or inconsistent with AM. This property
allows us to ask how inconsistency with AM translates into play in the pris-
oners dilemma (PD) game. After we screened the subjects for their types
we had them play a one-shot prisoners dilemma with a randomly chosen
opponent. A naive conjecture could be that those who have violated AM
should cooperate at higher rate than the rest. We do not see this in the
data. But this should not be too surprising because the strategic aspect of
PD makes it a much more complicated environment. Subjects have to form
conjectures about opponentsbehavior and other-regarding preferences (e.g.,
Rabin 1993, Bolton and Ockenfels 1999, Fehr and Schmidt 2000, Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger 2004, Andreoni and Samuelson 2006) that are typically hard
to measure or control5. In the so formulated unobserved state space, the an-
tecedent of AM may or may not hold. This is why games are not an ideal
environment for testing AM.
5With the exception of PD game in the last task all these considerations are absent in
our experiment.
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3 The experiment and hypotheses
3.1 The experiment
The objective was to create a simple, nonstrategic environment in which
violation of AM can be observed directly. For this purpose we designed an
experiment in which each treatment had two parts and each part consisted
of two tasks. The rst part was intended to elicit the antecedent of AM and
the second to verify its implication. The rst part was very simple. In task 1
the subject was asked to choose between two options R (Right) and L (Left).
If she chose R she got $85 and if she chose L she got $75. In task 2, she
again had to choose between two options R and L. But now if she chose R
she received $35 and if she chooses L she received $25.
In task 3 a subject was asked to choose between the dominantlottery
R and a the dominatedlottery L as shown in the Figure 1, panel (a). AM
implies that if the subject chose the higher amount in both tasks 1 and 2
then the same subject should prefer the dominant lottery R; with prizes $85
and $35; to the dominated lottery L with prizes $75 and $256.
Figure 1: Task 3
Fixed Columns Switched Columns
Left Right Left Right
B-ball Num. > 20 75 85 B-ball Num. > 20 85 75
B-ball Num.  20 25 35 B-ball Num.  20 25 35
(a) (b)
Note: B-ball Num.refers the number on the ball chosen from the bingo cage.
Interesting situation occurs when the subject takes the lower amount in
one of the tasks 1 or 2. Then, Fixed Columns (FC) version of task 3, as shown
6Our payo¤s are very similar to those used by Shar and Tversky (1992b) and Croson
(1999) who have both found a large amount of disjunct behavior in the prisoners dilemma
game with almost identical payo¤s. The only di¤erence is that in our case the lower payo¤s
of L and R are 25 and 35 instead of 30 and 35.
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in the Figure 1 panel (a), is a test of AM only if we are willing to believe that
the subject had made a mistake in tasks 1 or 2. But if say the lower amount
were truly preferred to the higher amount in task 1, then the appropriate test
of AM is the Switched Columns (SC) formulation of task 3 as shown in panel
(b). Similar SC formulation is needed for a choice of the lower amount in
task 2. We ran one of our treatments (the Transparenttreatment) under
both conditions FC and SC7. The other treatment (Non-transparent) was
run only under SC condition.
The lotteries R and L in task 3 were resolved with the same randomiza-
tions device - a bingo cage. The balls in the bingo cage were uniquely labeled
with numbers between 1-40. The higher prize of the chosen lottery was paid
out whenever the number on the ball drawn from the bingo cage exceeded 20.
Otherwise, the subject earned the lower prize. In the Transparent treatment
we gave the subjects all the details about the bingo cage. Subjects were told
that there were exactly 40 uniquely labeled balls in the bingo cage. Then,
they were all invited come to the front of the room8 where all the balls from
the bingo-cage were lined up and ordered in the ascending order so they could
easily inspect that all we told them was true. In the second Non-transparent
treatment subjects were told that the balls were uniquely labeled from 1-40
but we did not reveal anything about how many balls were in the bingo cage.
The bingo-cage contained 35 balls. Subjects did see the bingo cage placed in
the front of the room but were not invited to come and inspect the contents.
The nal task of the experiment was the prisoners dilemma game with
payo¤s weve been using all along. Subjects were told that in this task (and
7Only one treatment was run under both conditions because in the experiment only a
few subjects had chosen the lower amount in tasks 1 or 2. It would have been very costly to
run both treatments under both conditions. The Transparent treatment was deemed more
appropriate because there the behavior of subjects who had chosen the higher amount in
both tasks 1 and 2 was very convincing: they committed virtually zero violations in task 3.
Therefore, for example under the assumption that subjects choice of the lower amount in
one of the tasks 1 or 2 was due to a mistake and mistakes are not correlated across tasks,
we would have had a clear prediction of no violation of AM under FC condition even for
this group of subjects. We refer the reader to the results section for further discussion.
8This was done row-by-row.
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only in this task) they are matched with one randomly chosen participant.
The frame of the PD is presented in Figure 2
Figure 2: Task 4
Left Right
The person who you
are matched with
chose: Left
75 , 75 25 , 85
The person who you
are matched with
chose: Right
25 , 85 35 , 35
To minimize the chance of distortions due to possible peer and exper-
imenter e¤ects9 we minimized social distance by adopting a double-blind
protocol. Subjects were separated from each other by blinders that fully sur-
rounded each of them and provided complete privacy. In the experiment each
subject was identied by a number that was inscribed on a card randomly
drawn from a hat. This number was entered by the subject on the opening
9Tasks 1 and 2 are so simple and transparent that they may seem unnecessary. After
all, who would ever take less money if more is available? We can think of at least two
reasons why this could happen. For instance, subjects may try to avoid the shame from
appearing greedy in front of their peers or the experimenter (who might become their
future professor). There is an established literature on the importance of double-blind
protocol in preventing these peer-e¤ects in experiments (Ho¤man et al. 1996, Eckel and
Grossman 1996).
We have had our own share of experience. In our early pilots that were run pen-and-
paper in a nonanonymous classroom setting we found as much as 50% of subjects taking
the lower amount in tasks 1 and 2. This stands in stark contrast with the data we obtained
in the actual experiment in which we used (i) double-blind procedure and (ii) we stated
clearly in the instructions that the experiment was funded by an external grant in order to
mitigate the possibility that subjects think they are taking money out of our own pocket.
The second explanation for taking the lower amount could be that some subjects are
simply more prone to making mistakes than others. Their behavior might be qualitatively
di¤erent form those who do not make mistakes. In either case, whether the lower amount
is taken due to preferences or mistakes, our initial two tasks 1 and 2 are able to detect
such person and allow us to analyze these types separately from the rest.
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screen of the software. At the end of the experiment the experimenter put all
payments in the respective envelopes with the corresponding numbers writ-
ten on the top of them. One of the subjects was again randomly selected to
hand out the envelopes to everyone else in the room10,11.
To get at our questions we used a within subject design in which tasks
come in sequence. Since under SC, payo¤s in task three were contingent on
task 1 and 2 choices, tasks were unfolded to the subject one at a time. A
computer which observed choices in tasks 1 and 2, constructed and presented
the subject with task three.
Sequencing of tasks could cause order e¤ects. We control for order e¤ects
by randomizing the order of tasks. To preserve the natural structure of the
AM implication we only randomized the order of the tasks 1 and 2 and the
order of tasks 3 and 4. Furthermore, we were worried that responding to
tasks may become automatic if the same column with the higher amount(s)
is always associated with the same button, e.g., Right. For this reason we
also randomized the assignment of columns to buttons for each task and each
subject.
The experiment was run at ITAM in the computer laboratory. The soft-
ware was written in Visual Basic 6.0. Together 162 subjects participated in
the experiment. The Non-transparent and Transparent treatments consisted
of 3 and 6 sessions respectively with 12 - 20 students per session. The stu-
dents were recruited form the 1st year introductory courses o¤ered at ITAM,
i.e., they had only minimal exposure to economics. The experiment was
10In exchange for the envelope she collected the card with the number that matched the
envelope. The cards were then handed back to the experimenter.
11One of the major di¢ culties with double blind procedure is with having subjects sign
the payment receipts. At that point a name and face is clearly related to the amount (and
decisions) made in the experiment. We by-passed this problem by having each subject
sign a payment form with the average amount earned by a subject in the experiment. This
procedure was explained to subjects verbally.
10
run in Spanish12,13. Our assistant who is a native Spanish speaker has read
the instructions aloud for the whole class. This was followed by a round
of privately answering subjectsindividual questions. The opening screen of
the software contained a page of comprehension questions that had to be
answered correctly by everyone before the experiment could begin. The ex-
periment lasted for about 45 minutes. Subjects were paid 50 Pesos as a show
fee and half of their total point earnings in the experiment. The average
payment was 155 Pesos.
3.2 Hypotheses
In the experiment we observe choices and not preferences nor the subjects
construct of the state space. Therefore, before we state our hypotheses it is
necessary to dene an observational equivalent of the AM for our experiment.
This we call the monotonicity principle:
Monotonicity Principle: Choice satises the principle of monotonicity
if the dominant lottery is chosen in task three.
Recall that in the Transparent treatment we carefully explained to sub-
jects all details of the randomization device in task 3. If this was understood
by them, then the state space can be represented by the numbers inscribed in
the balls. So, S = f1; 2; :::::; 39; 40g. Let ct denote choice in task t and let at
denote the alternative which was not chosen. Task 1 can be viewed as a choice
such that the chosen amount is preferred to the alternative, i.e., c1P ()a1.
Similarly for task 2 we have, c2P ()a2. For all s 2 f1; ::::20g the dominant
lottery gives c1 and the dominated lottery gives a1. For s 2 f21; ::::; 40g,
the dominant lottery gives c2 and the dominated lottery gives a2. Then, by
12The instructions and the software were initially written in English, then translated
to Spanish by our assistant, and consequently translated back to English by our second
assistant to ensure the accuracy of the translation.
13The English version of the instructions can be found in the Appendix C.
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AM,14 the dominant lottery must be preferred to the dominated lottery. This
stronger version of AM implies our rst hypothesis.
H1: If AM holds under transparency, then we will observe no (or negli-
gible number of) dominated lottery choices in the Transparent treatment.
In the Non-transparent treatment the randomization process is bit more
obscure. The hypothetical state space is still S = f1; 2; :::::; 39; 40g; because
the subject knows that a ball in the bingo cage has a unique number be-
tween 1 and 40. However, if she were to start deliberating on what the
actual state space could be she would be overwhelmed. For there could po-
tentially be 240   1 sets of potential states. Maybe less, for she could still
see some balls in the cage. But the point remains that if she were to start
her process of deliberation by trying to gure the number of balls in the
cage, she would probably be overwhelmed. In such a scenario, she could well
resort to Gilboas process as highlighted in the introduction. Alternately,
our decision maker could start her process of deliberation by starting from
the hypothetical state space with forty elements and continue as previously
stated. Under the latter scenario, we obtain the following hypothesis.
H2: If AM holds, then under both transparency and non-transparency,
then we will observe no (negligible number of) dominated lottery choices in
both treatments.
Our next question of interest is how does a violation of AM a¤ect play in
the prisoners dilemma. To choose a strategy in a game the player has to form
a belief about the opponents strategy and type (in terms of the opponents
other regarding payo¤s). This necessarily puts the player in the situation
14To test AM through revealed preferences, in a simple setting as ours, we need a
stronger version of AM. This version would read as follows:
We say that preference  satises the strong axiom of monotonicity in B, where B  A,
if for any pair of acts f and g in B, such that f(s)P ()g(s) for all s in 
, we have f  g.
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with reduced transparency, i.e., akin to the Non-transparent treatment. We
speculate that the same factors that are responsible for the violation of AM
in the decision theoretic setting will also contribute to the choice of the
dominated strategy (cooperation) in the PD game.
H3: Subjects who violated AM will cooperate in the prisoners dilemma
at higher rate than subjects who did not violate AM.
4 Results
As the rst step we check the consistency of behavior in tasks (1, 2, and 4)
that were una¤ected by treatment variations.
Table 1: Choice frequencies in tasks 1, 2 and 4
Treatments
Non-transp. Transp.
Tasks 1 and 2: took the higher amount 85% 82.4%
Task 4: chose the dominated strategy 45% 47.1%
No. of observations 60 102
Note: Task 3 is left out intentionally and is analyzed in detail in Table 2.
The Table 1 shows that there are indeed no di¤erences. In addition, there
is nothing irregular about the behavior in three tasks 1, 2 and 4. In tasks 1
and 2 most of the subjects revealed preferences for money and took the higher
amount. Somewhat surprisingly, however, a minority (about 15-20%) took
the lower amount at least once. We will return to this subgroup in the later
section. Task 4 was the PD game. The observed cooperation rates are 45-
47% and this is consistent with the previous ndings in the literature15. Next
we turn to our main result - the evidence on the violation of monotonicity.
15Fishers exact test shows no signicant di¤erences between frequencies for Tasks 1 and
2 (p-value = 0:687) and also for Task 4 (p-value = 0:429).
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4.1 Violation of the Monotonicity Axiom
Task 3 presented the subjects with a choice between two lotteries. The
dominant lottery, in which the prizes were the chosen amounts in the initial
two tasks, and the dominated lottery, with prizes equal to the amounts left
unchosen.




Higher amount in both task 1 and 2 17.7% 2.4% 4.4% 0%
(9/51) (2/82) (2/45) (0/39)
Lower amount in task 1 or task 2 66.7% - 72.7% 28.6%
(6/9) - (8/11) (2/7)
Combined 25% - 17.9% 4.4%
(15/60) - (10/56) (2/46)
Note: The ratios in parenthesis give the actual number of observations.
The top row presents number of violations for the sub-sample (82-85%) of
subjects who have chosen the higher amount in both initial two tasks. This
gives the cleanest test of AM because for these subjects we are condent that
the antecedent of AM is satised. Furthermore, for this subgroup there was
no di¤erence between SC and FC conditions. All four tasks were exactly
the same. Therefore, we present a test based on the pooled data. The
incidence of dominated lottery choices in the Non transparent treatment was
as high as 17.7% and in the Transparent treatment only 2.4%. The di¤erence
is signicant on 1% level with the p-value of one-sided (two-sided) Fishers
exact test16 being 0.006 (0.008)17. Based on this evidence we reject H2 but
cannot reject H1.
16The p-values in the reminder of this paper are based on this test.
17The di¤erence between Non transparency and and individual Transparency conditions
is also signicant. One-sided (two-sided) p-values for the Non transparency vs. SC condi-
tion are 0.064 (0.108) and for the Non transparency vs. FC condition are 0.009 (0.011).
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Result 1: AM holds in the most basic decision-theoretic setting. Under
transparency only 2.4% of subjects violate AM. Under non-transparency a
signicant 17.7% of subjects violate AM.
The subjects who chose the lower amount in at least one of the tasks 1
or 2 account for about 15-20% of the data. This makes them less important
but nonetheless a quite interesting group. Their dominated lottery choices
are shown in the second row of Table 218. For these subjects we have much
less condence that the antecedent of AM is satised because the choice of
the lower amount in task 1 or 2 seems somewhat strange. It could be that
this choice is preference driven but it could also be that it is a product of a
mistake.
We cannot and would not want to rule out either of the explanations.
Under the assumption that all choices in our experiment are preference driven
the appropriate test of AM is the formulation of task 3 with switched columns,
i.e., condition SC. On the other hand, if the choice of the lower amount
occurred due to a mistake, then the appropriate test of AM is task 3 with
the xed columns, i.e., condition FC.
The data in Table 2 show that under preference assumption it would be
that majority of subjects, 72.7%, violate AM. Under the mistakes assumption
the proportion of would-be violators drops down to 28.8% but it is still far
from negligible.19 From our experiment we cannot determine whether choices
are preference- or mistake-driven. But irrespective of which one it is the data
indicate that the number of AM violators is likely to be higher for this group
then for the previous group20.
18Additional tables allowing a deeper look in the data can be found in the Appendix B.
19The test of the hypotheses that the proportions AM violators in the subsample of those
who always took the higher amount (2/82) and those who did not under FC condition
(2/7) is rejected on the 5% level (p-value is 0.045)
20The power of this conclusion is limited by the small sample-size that its based on.
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4.2 Play in the Prisoners Dilemma
In the previous sections we have shown that a signicant proportion of sub-
jects violate AM. This brings up a question about the implications of this
nding for the dominance play in games. Recall from our previous discussion
that both Shar and Tversky (1992, 1993) and Croson (1999) have found a
large proportion of what appeared to be AM violations (in the order of 30%)
in the prisoners dilemma game. They called this the disjunction e¤ect.
However, PD game arguably involves more complex state space where each
element signies a strategy and payo¤ type. Cooperation can occur for other
reasons that are unrelated to the monotonicity of choice. For instance, in the
PD game players split the payo¤s between the two of them which can bring
in social preferences to play a role in their decisions21; secondly, in the PD
game players face strategic uncertainty which requires that they form beliefs
about the otherspreferences and strategy choices. This is certainly a great
leap from simple bingo-cage-type uncertainty with 50/50 chances. However,
here we are only interested in a very simple question: is the violation of AM
one of the drivers of cooperation in the PD game. Our experiment allows us
to screen each subject for her type, either she is an AM violator or not, and
then relate her type to her behavior in the PD game.
We only look at the data for subjects who chose the higher amount in
both tasks 1 and 2. Only for this subgroup we have su¢ cient condence that
a choice of dominated lottery in task 3 is a violation of AM. It is natural
to suppose that those subjects who violate AM in our simple setting would
also tend to violate AM in more complex settings. Based on this we could,
under the additional assumption that the antecedent of AM is satised in
the PD game, expect AM violators to cooperate in the PD game at higher
rate than non-violators. But not surprisingly we cannot quite conclude this
from the data. The proportion of cooperators amongst those who took the
higher amount in tasks 1 and 2 and did not violate AM is 42.8% (18/42).
21For example due to distribution-based (e.g., see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000 or Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) or belief-based (Rabin 1993) preferences.
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Amongst those who did violate AM the proportion is higher, 55.6% (5/9),
but the di¤erence is not signicant (the p-value is 0.45).
Result 2: Violation of AM does not imply cooperative behavior in the
prisoners dilemma game.
Thus, we can reject the H3 hypothesis. This suggests that there may be
a fundamental disconnect between violation of AM and what is known in the
literature as the disjunction e¤ect.
4.3 Discussion
Several points should be noted.
1. The reader may have two concerns. First, the individual tasks were
very simple. One may wonder whether simplicityof the initial two tasks
could have led, via some experimenter demand e¤ect, to violations of AM
(see footnote 9). But, such simplicity, and hence the possible experimenter
demand e¤ects, do not vary between our treatments. However, AM violations
do di¤er.
The second concern has to do with the small proportion of subjects
who violated AM in the Non-transparent treatment. We believe that size
is an important issue when one is concerned about the empirical validity of
an axiom. We are far from such a concern. Our experiment simply suggests
that AM is not violated in the environment that makes it easy for subjects to
formulate state space correctly. When formulation of the state space is more
di¢ cult, then (what can at worst be called statistically traceable) violations
of AM emerge. Does this mean that AM violations would increase if the
relevant state space is more complex? Perhaps, yes. But before we even try
to answer the question we would have to have a better understanding of what
complexity is and how it could be measured. Without such understanding,
the best one could do is to run experiments in various di¤erent contexts and
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see if AM holds. One has to be cautious though. In complex situations, like
say in a game, the antecedent of AM may be hard to verify.
2. Our experiment suggests that if and when subjects learn enough about
the state space, there would be no violation of AM. Indeed in almost all ex-
pected utility representations, the decision maker is assumed to be aware
of the state space. Of course, there is an issue about what this awareness
means. Leaving aside such concerns, one would ideally like to see if AM vio-
lations decrease as subjects learn more in the laboratory. Such experiments
would, however, be more complex than what we present in this paper. Espe-
cially if beliefs are to be elicited through incentive compatible mechanisms,
some amount of clarity may have to be sacriced. Our paper provides a
motivation for such kinds of more complex experiments in the future.
3. Though we assert that AM would vanish with learning, we provide no
evidence for the assertion. Such learning could take time. In the meantime,
we agree that, violators of AM could have important consequences for others.
Shiller (1998) observes that AM violators could be causing higher volatility
in nancial markets. In the same vein, asset market bubbles may be fueled
by AM violators and more importantly by those who pretend to be AM
violators. Informed and rational traders could take advantage by mimicking
such types, leading to a market bubble and then jumping the gun just before
the crash. This is the main idea behind the greater fool theory, see for
example Kindelberger (2000) and Allen and Gorton (1993).
4. In our Transparent treatment, subjects could perhaps agree with each
other on the probabilities to be assigned to each ball. In the Non-transparent
treatment, where the total number of balls is not known, this is not necessar-
ily the case. Hence one could perhaps call the choice in the Non-transparent
treatment, choice under ambiguity.If so, then what is the relationship be-
tween our experiment and that of Ellsberg? A basic di¤erence is that, in the
case of Ellsberg, subjects could avoid to choose ambiguous lotteries whereas
in our experiment subjects could not.
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5. One may wonder whether our ndings cannot be interpreted as (or
driven by) ambiguity aversion found in numerous Ellsberg-type experiments,
e.g., Halevy (2007), Ahn et al. (2011). In the Ellsberg experiment, subjects
violated axiom P2 of Savage (or completeness or transitivity). P2 is also
known as the sure thing principle.We explicitly dene P2 in the Appendix.
How is P2 related to AM? We deal with this question in the Appendix C.
We show that, in general, when the state space has three or more elements,
P2 is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for AM. A reader may assert that in
our experiment, the relevant state space has cardinality two. We show that,
when there are just two acts available for choice and the state space has two
elements, P2 can never be violated but AM can. So our point of view is that
one should not invoke P2 to interpret violations of AM.
6. There is one way, however, to relate P2 to AM. If one were to consider
the set of all possible acts and the cardinality of the state space were to be
two. Then, we show that, AM implies P2. In this scenario, one could say
that a subject who violates P2 in some subset of A would surely violate AM
over some pair of acts in A. We do not like this interpretation. If one were to
indeed talk in terms of the hypothetical then with four consequences, as in
our experiment, we do not know how to justify the claim that the relevant
cardinality of the state space is two. We deal with this issue explicitly in the
Appendix.
7. Another axiom of Savage that is similar to AM is P3. Again, in the Ap-
pendix, we show that P3 is neither necessary not su¢ cient for AM. In a sense
P3 is a restriction which makes some set of dynamic preferences (as uncer-
tainty lessens) compatible with static preferences. AM is a restriction which




The disjunction e¤ect literature reports on data that is inconsistent with
AM. A reason for such violations is provided by the Bolker-Je¤rey approach
to decision making. Here a decision maker deliberates on the probability
of consequences. Such deliberations make sense when the state space is
di¢ cult to formulate. This motivated a careful test where violations of AM
was recorded over two treatments. In one treatment, the state space was
made transparent. In the other, the state space was less transparent. We
found that in the simple environment, that allowed the decision maker to
formulate the state space relatively easily, AM is not violated. When the
nature of uncertainty is more obscure, we nd signicant violations.
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Appendix
A Relationship between axioms
Here we discuss the relationship between two axioms of Savage, respectively
P2 and P3, and the Axiom of Monotonicity (see below for denitions).
Let there be a nite set of consequences C with two or more elements, a
nite set of states of nature 
. Acts, which are functions f : 
  ! C. Let
the set of all acts be A. Let E denote a non-null, strict subset of 
 and Ec
its complement in 
.
Savages P2: We say that P2 is satised in B, where B  A, if for any
four acts f; g; f 0 and g0 in B and any E  
 such that: (i) f(s) = f 0(s) and
g(s) = g0(s) for all s in E; (ii) f(s) = g(s) and f 0(s) = g0(s) for all s in Ec;
and (iii) f  g, we have f 0  g0:
Ellsbergs experiments showed that a sizeable proportion of people violate
the behavior stated in P2. Could it be the case that AM is violated by only
those who violate P2? Note from the denition that if f; g; f 0 and g0 are
not distinct acts, then P2 is trivially satised. Thus, if the cardinality of B
is equal to 2, as in our experiment, P2 can never be violated whereas AM
can. So, in a rather narrow sense, one can say that AM is not necessarily
violated by only those who violate P2. The point, however, is to understand
the relationship between P2 and AM in a broader sense. That is, when we
take the set B to be equal to A.
Individual who violate P2 in A, need not violate AM in A. This fact is
known in the literature. For example, the motivation behind most expected
utility representations under ambiguity is that P2 does not hold. Yet, all
these representations assume that AM holds. So it must be that a violation
of P2 does not imply a violation of AM, or equivalently, AM does not imply
P2. Actually, neither is it the case that P2 implies AM. Examples 1 and 2
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illustrate this fact. In Example 1, P2 is violated but AM is not. In Example
2, AM is violated but P2 is not.
Example 1: Let 
 = fs1; s2; s3g; C = f1; 0g; A = fp; q; r; s; t; u; v; wg;
acts map to consequences as follows (e.g. p(s1) = 1):
s1 s2 s3
p 1 1 1
q 1 1 0
r 1 0 1
s 0 1 1
t 0 0 1
u 0 1 0
v 1 0 0
w 0 0 0
Preferences over acts are as follows: p  q  r  s  t  u  v  w.
By transitivity, p  w and hence, 1 P () 0. AM is satised in A, by the
given preferences. The way to check it is as follows. Consider q, we have
q(s3) = 0, otherwise q(s) = 1. Note that q is strictly preferred over all other
acts which result in 0 in state s3. There are no other acts listed below q
which has consequence 1 in states s1 and s2. Similarly for other acts.
To see that P2 is violated in A, consider E = fs1; s3g, Ec = fs2g. Note
that: (i) q(s) = v(s) and s(s) = t(s) in E; (ii) q(s) = s(s) and v(s) = t(s);
(iii) q  s. However, t  v.
This example shows that when the cardinality of 
 is greater than two,
then it is not the case that (in A) AM implies P2. We now show, by example,
that neither is it the case that P2 implies AM. In the example below, AM is
violated in A, but P2 is not.
Example 2: As before, let
 = fs1; s2; s3g; C = f1; 0g; A = fp; q; r; s; t; u; v; wg;
acts map to consequences as follows:
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s1 s2 s3
p 1 1 0
q 1 1 1
r 1 0 1
s 0 1 1
t 0 0 1
u 0 1 0
v 1 0 0
w 0 0 0
Preferences over acts are as follows: p  q  r  s  t  u  v  w.
By transitivity, q  w. Hence, 1 P () 0. Now note that AM is violated
in A as q(s)  p(s) for all s, but p  q. We now come to the tedious part of
showing that P2 is not violated. Because of our earlier observation, we shall
consider only distinct acts.
Let E = fs1; s2g. Note that the set fp; q; s; ug satises the antecedent
of P2. To see this, rename f  p, f 0  q, g0  s, g  u. Check that: (i)
f(s) = f 0(s) and g(s) = g0(s) for s in E; (ii) f(s) = g(s) and f 0(s) = g0(s) in
Ec; (iii) f  g. Since f 0  g0, P2 is satised.
Let fp; q; t; wg  ff; f 0; g0; gg (i.e. p is renamed f etc.). Check that: (i)
f(s) = f 0(s) and g(s) = g0(s) for s in E; (ii) f(s) = g(s) and f 0(s) = g0(s) in
Ec; (iii) f  g. Since f 0  g0, P2 is satised. From now, we simply state the
set of acts and rename them. The "check" remains the same as above.
fp; q; r; vg  ff; f 0; g0; gg; fr; s; u; vg  ff; g; g0; f 0g; fr; t; v; wg  ff; g; f 0; g0g
(in (iii) we get f  g, while f 0  g0; which does not violate P2); fs; t; u; wg 
ff; g; f 0; g0g (here in (iii) of the antecedent we get f  g, while f 0  g0; which
does not violate P2).
Given E = fs1; s2g, there are no more sets of acts which satisfy P2.
Let E = fs2; s3g. Check: fp; u; q; sg  ff; f 0; g; g0g (here in (iii) of the
antecedent we get f  g, while f 0  g0); fp; u; r; tg  ff; f 0; g; g0g (here
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again in (iii) of the antecedent we get f  g, while f 0  g0); fp; u; v; wg 
ff; f 0; g; g0g; fq; s; r; tg  ff; f 0; g; g0g (again in (iii) of the antecedent we get
f  g, while f 0  g0); fq; s; v; wg  ff; f 0; g; g0g; fr; t; v; wg  ff; f 0; g; g0g.
Let E = fs1; s3g. Check: fp; v; u; wg  ff; f 0; g; g0g; fp; v; s; tg 
ff; f 0; g; g0g (here in (iii) of the antecedent we get f  g, while f 0  g0);
fp; v; q; rg  ff; f 0; g; g0g (here in (iii) of the antecedent we get f  g, while
f 0  g0); fq; r; s; tg  ff; f 0; g; g0g (in (iii) of the antecedent we get f  g,
while f 0  g0); fq; r; u; wg  ff; f 0; g; g0g; fs; t; u; wg  ff; f 0; g; g0g (here in
(iii) of the antecedent we get f  g, while f 0  g0).
This ends the example.
Note that the structure of both the examples is such that it is easy to
extend them to cases where the cardinality of 
 is strictly greater than three.
The reader may assert that in our experiment, the relevant state space
is of cardinality two. This is because, in both lotteries, all consequences
are the same for balls drawn with numbers greater than 20 and similarly,
all consequences are the same for balls drawn with numbers less than or
equal to 20. But this is so only for the narrow sense, i.e. when comparisons
are made over B (the subset of acts) which has only two elements. And
we have already seen that in such cases, P2 always holds. On the other
hand, in our experiment C (the set of consequences) has four elements. So
in the the set A (the set of all acts) we have acts for which the set of all
states cannot be meaningfully partitioned into two. For example, the act
which has consequences $25, $35, $75 and $85, when the ball drawn has
numbers belonging to sets f1; ::; 10g; f11; ::; 20g, f21; ::; 30g; and f31; ::; 40g
respectively.
The reader may still want to know about the relationship between AM
and P2 when the cardinality of 
 is two. Here, the surprising result is that
AM implies P2.
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Proposition 1 Let 
 = fs1; s2g. AM implies P2.
Proof. Let c1; c2; c3; c4 be consequences in C. P2 is trivially satised
unless (i) f(s1) = f 0(s1) = c1 and g(s1) = g0(s1) = c2; (ii) f(s2) = g(s2) = c3
and f 0(s2) = g0(s2) = c4. So suppose (i) and (ii). By completeness, either
c1Rc2 or c2Rc1. Without loss of generality, let c1Rc2. Since, f(s1) = c1,
g(s1) = c2 and f(s2) = g(s2) = c3, then, by AM, we have f  g. Now,
f 0(s1) = c1, g0(s1) = c2 and f 0(s2) = g0(s2) = c4. Therefore, by AM, we have
f 0  g0. 
This result says that all those who violate P2 also violate AM. The other
way around is not necessarily true. So the number of people who violate
AM cannot be greater than the number who violate P2. In this sense, the
number of people who violate AM provides a lower bound for the number
who violate P2.
We now state P3:
Savages P3: Let f; g; f 0 and g0 be four acts in B, where B  A, such
that f 0(s) = x and g0(s) = y for all s in 
 and f(s) = f 0(s) and g(s) = g0(s)
for all s in E. We say that P3 is satised in B when: f 0  g0 i¤ f E g.
The fact that AM is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for P3 should be
clear. Nevertheless, we provide two examples. In example 3, P3 is violated
but AM is not. In example 4, AM is violated but P3 is not.
Example 3: 
 = fs1; s2; s3g; C = f1; 0g; B = fp; q; rg, where B  A.
s1 s2 s3
p 1 1 1
q 0 0 1
r 0 0 0
Preferences over acts: p  q  r.
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A conditional preference: q E r E p, where E = fs1; s2g.
Here p  r implies 1 P () 0. It is easy to see that AM is satised by the
given preference over acts. P3 is violated due to q E p.
P3 is violated because of event dependent preferences.To see this, let
s1 and s2 stand for heavy and medium showers and s3 stand for a sunny
day. Let 0 stand for an umbrella and 1 for a hat. A decision maker wants
to go out for a walk the next day. Today, he has to choose between a hat
and an umbrella (or a lottery which gives him a hat tomorrow irrespective of
the state, and a lottery which gives him an umbrella tomorrow irrespective
of the state). Suppose the decision maker believes that it is unlikely to rain
tomorrow. It makes sense for him to choose a hat. Next day she nds out
that it is raining, though she still does not know whether rains would be
heavy or medium when she goes out for the walk. She might now prefer
an umbrella over a hat. The point here is that preferences conditional on
some event may be quite at odds with unconditional preferences. P3 is a
way to relate conditional and unconditional preferences. AM is a way to
relate unconditional preference over acts to preference over consequences (or
prizes). These are quite di¤erent restrictions.
The next example violates AM but not P3.
Example 4: 
 = fs1; s2; s3g; C = f1; 0g; B = fp; q; rg, where B  A.
s1 s2 s3
p 1 1 1
q 0 0 1
r 0 0 0
Preferences over acts: q  p  r.
Conditional preference with E = fs1; s2g, E = fs1g, E = fs2g: p E
q E r.
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Conditional preference with E = fs2; s3g, E = fs1; s3g, E = fs3g: p E
q E r.
P3 is not violated here because it puts no restrictions on the uncondi-
tional preference between p and q, while AM does. The only unconditional
preference on which P3 puts a restriction on is that between p and r.
B Additional tables
Table 3: Dominated lottery choices in Task 3
Took lower amount in tasks 1 or 2
Order Payo¤s
First task Second task Task 1 Task2
encountered 75 vs. 85 25 vs. 35
Non-transp. 75% 0% 60% 66%
(6/8) (0/1) (3/5) (4/6)
Transp. SC 66.7% 80% 75% 66.7%
(4/6) (4/5) (6/8) (2/3)
Transp. FC 50% 0% 0% 40%
(2/4) (0/3) (0/2) (2/5)
Total 66.7% 44.4% 60% 57.1%
(12/18) (4/9) (9/15) (8/14)
Note: The ratios in parenthesis give the actual number of observations.
C Instructions
Below is the English version of the instructions. The instructions below
are those used in the Transparency treatment. In the Non transparency
treatment the changes were that the text in [] was added and the text in { }
was deleted.
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Task 3: Satised AM
T1&2: Both high 18/42 35/82 20/43 15/39
42.9% 42.7% 46.5% 38.5%
T1&2: One low 2/3 7/8 2/3 5/5
66.7% 87.5% 66.7% 50%
Task 3: Violated AM
T1&2: Both high 5/9 0/2 0/2 0/0
55.6% 0% 0% -
T1&2: One low 2/6 6/10 4/8 2/2
33.3% 60% 50% 100%
Total 45% 47.1% 46.4% 47.8%
27/60 48/102 26/56 22/46
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. From this moment on no talking is allowed.
If you have a question after we nish reading the instructions, please raise
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question
in privacy.
The experiment consists of 4 tasks that will be presented to you in se-
quence (one after another). In each task you will be asked to make a single
decision.
Earnings
The amount you earn in this experiment will be paid to you in cash at
the end of the experiment. The funding for this experiment was provided by
an external grant from Asociation Mexicana de Cultura.
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You will be paid according to the following rule:
50 pesos for coming on time to the experiment + 1
2
* (the points that you
earn in each of the four tasks of the experiment).
Privacy
In this experiment you are completely anonymous. The experimental pro-
cedure that will be described to you in detail insures that NO ONE including
the experimenters will be able to know which decision was made by you.
Tasks and Decisions
You will be seated at the computer terminal which is shielded by blinders
to insure your complete privacy. In front of you there is a folded card with
a number which will identify you throughout the experiment. You will use
this number to make your decisions and also to redeem your payment.
After we nish reading these instructions and answer any questions that
you may have, you will be asked to follow the instructions on the computer
screen. The software will guide you through the tasks of the experiment.
When we start the experiment you will see the following screen:
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Figure 1
Please enter your identication number which is written on the card in
front of you. Make sure that you copy the number correctly. If you make a
mistake we will not be able to pay you your earnings.
Next you will be asked to complete a series of comprehension questions.
These questions ensure that you have properly understood the instructions.
You will not be allowed to proceed with the experiment unless you have
answered all questions correctly. Once you have answered the instructions
the Task 1 of the experiment begins.
TASK 1: The task is very simple. On the screen (Figure 2) you see two
boxes each containing a single number.
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Figure 2
This screen is just an example. In the experiment the numbers in boxes
may be switched.
All you have to do is to choose a box (left or right) by clicking on the
appropriate button labeled either Leftor Right.The number inside of
the box that you choose represents the number of points that you earn in
this task.
TASK 2: The instructions for task 2 are exactly the same as for task 1.




This screen is just an example. In the experiment the numbers in boxes
may be switched.
In this task (Figure 3) you see 4 boxes. The boxes are grouped horizon-
tally into two rows and also vertically into two columns.
You are asked to choose a column (left or right) by clicking on the appro-
priate button labeled either Leftor Right.
The number of points you earn is equal to the number in box which is
(i) inside of the column that you have selected and also
(ii) inside of the row which will be decided randomly at the end of
the experiment by a draw of a single ball from a bingo cage. This is done in
the following way:
The bingo cage in front of the room contains [forty] balls that are labeled
with numbers between 1 and 40. No two balls have the same number. {The
number of balls in the bingo cage is decided by the experimenter.} After
everyone has completed the experiment one of the participants will be ran-
domly selected to spin the bingo cage and draw a single ball. If the number
on the ball is 20 then the top row is chosen. If the number on the ball is
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di¤erent from 20 then the bottom row is chosen.
TASK 4:
Figure 4
This task is similar to task 3. The di¤erence is that now you are ran-
domly matched with one other person in this room. In Figure 4 you see 4
boxes. The boxes are grouped horizontally into two rows and also vertically
into two columns. Each box contains two numbers. The number labeled
You earn:represents the number of points that you earn when that box is
selected. Similarly, the number labeled He/she earns:represents the num-
ber of points that the person you are matched with earns when that box is
selected.
Which box is selected depends on your decision as well as on the decision
of the other person that you are matched with. Both you and the other
person simultaneously choose a column (left or right) by clicking on the ap-
propriate button labeled either Leftor Right.The box which is selected
for payment lies
(i) inside of the column that you have chosen and also
(ii) it is inside of the row which depends on what the other person
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has done: if he/she chose left, then the top row is selected; and if he/she
chose right, the bottom row is selected.
The order of tasks
In the experiment you will rst complete tasks 1 and 2 but the order in
which they appear is decided randomly. This means that you may encounter
task 2 as rst and task 1 as second. Then you complete tasks 3 and 4.
Again their order is decided randomly and you may complete task 4 before
you complete task 3. When everyone is nished with all four tasks you will
be asked to ll out a short questionnaire. After that one randomly chosen
participant will draw a ball from the bingo cage to determine which row is
played in the Task 3.
Payment
When everyone is nished with the experiment the experimenter will put
earnings of each student into a separate envelope and write the students
identication number on the top of the envelope. Then, one of the students
in the room will be randomly selected to distribute the envelopes to everyone
else in the room. To receive your earnings you will be asked to exchange the
card with your identication number for the envelope which contains your
earnings and has the same number written on the top of it. When you get
your envelope you may leave the room.
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